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Intentionally and Isomorphism in Aristotle
Christopher Shields 
University of Colorado at Boulder
The parallel Aristotle forges between noêsis and aisthêsis fissures at the 
seam of their material realizations: whereas the aisthêtikon has various 
organs, the noêtikon has none. The brief reason Aristotle offers for this 
disanalogy may seem initially quite unsatisfactory. To some, at any rate, 
Aristotle's claim that nous lacks an organ comes to little more than a low- 
level empirical gaffe.1 He observes that the eyes, ears and other sense organs 
play a central role in aisthêsis. Not detecting any such role for the brain or 
other organ in noêsis, Aristotle supposes that nous lacks an organ altogether, 
and infers that it is therefore separate and unmixed with the body (DA 429a24- 
27,429M-5). Thus, his chain of inference leads rather haphazardly from a 
dubious empirical finding to an extravagant philosophical thesis about the 
nature of nous. One taking this approach might well conclude that since we 
no longer suffer under the same impoverished empirical limitations, we can 
safely set aside Aristotle's unfortunate conception of nous as immaterial, and 
turn our attention to those features of his concept of mind more germane to 
our own concerns.
Perhaps not many will agree with this simple, unflattering diagnosis of 
Aristotle's motivation for regarding nous as in some sense immaterial. Still, 
some things Aristotle claims might suggest such a motivation, including 
especially his remarks about how nous would come to be qualified, perhaps 
by being hot or cold, if it had an organ (DA 429b25-6). Moreover, if there is 
general agreement that Aristotle does not reserve a special status for nous on 
the basis of a misguided empirical belief, there is little agreement about the 
genuine source of his reservation. Aristotle has some qualms about 
regarding thinking and perception as directly analogous, even though the 
same general account of form assimilation covers both. In this paper I 
investigate one central source of Aristotle's dissatisfaction with a 
comprehensive analogy between aisthêsis and noêsis. I will argue that his 
conception of nous as organless is neither empirically motivated nor
1 Wilkes (1978) typifies this approach. See also Hartman (1977).
obviously misguided. On the contrary, Aristotle's insistence that nous is 
separate and unmixed with the body is grounded in an approach to 
intentionality nascent in his treatment of noêsis.2 This approach to 
intentionality helps motivate the special status he awards nous.
I. Nous is Unmixed with the Body
Perception and thinking are alike in that the same model of form- 
reception covers both. In perception, as in thinking, some human faculty 
receives a form in such a way that the relevant psychic capacity is affected in a 
certain way (paschein ti).3 "If, then, thinking is just as perceiving <is>," 
Aristotle suggests, "<it will involve> a certain sort of being affected either by 
the object of thought or something else of this sort" (DA 429al3-15). Aristotle 
evidently endorses the antecedent of this conditional (DA 427a8, 431b28-32a3), 
even though the analogy does not hold in all particulars. Indeed, Aristotle 
had issued a warning to this effect earlier, in De Anima ii 5, where he 
suggested that thinking is up to us in a way in which perception is not (see 
especially 417M6-29, a passage which closes with a forward reference.
^This paper is drawn from a larger work, where I undertake a more general analysis 
of Aristotelian intentionality; I do not attempt such an analysis in this paper.
Rather, I seek to ground the peculiar status Aristotle confers on nous in a plausible 
central feature of his approach to the intentionality of the mental. For a 
comprehensive, if problematic, account of Aristotelian intentionality, see Brentano 
(1867/1977). I sketch some of the fundamental difficulties for Brentano’s account 
below in § IV.
3With the locution paschein ti, Aristotle might intend one of three things, of which 
only the first two have been recognized. If the indefinite ti is an accusative object of 
paschein, Aristotle means (i) in thinking nous suffers something; if, by contrast, ti is 
a noun agreeing with paschein, Aristotle means either (ii) thinking is a kind of 
being affected, or (iii) thinking is a being affected—kind of (that is, thinking is akin 
to being affected, but not quite a proper instance of it). See in addition to DA 429al4, 
410a25,427a20, 427b2, and de Part. An. 641 a36. The ambivalence expressed at DA 
417b2-16, and esp. at b6-7 and b!5-16, suggests that Aristotle probably intends (iii). 
Distinguishing between (i) and (ii) only, Hicks (1907, 292) thinks nothing much 
turns on the matter; he explicates Aristotle's ambivalence merely in terms of 
something's being affected by being annihilated by its opposite versus something's 
being changed by having one of its potentialities preserved and perfected. Since (iii) 
is a possibility, Aristotle's ambivalence may be more extreme: perhaps noêsis is not 
a proper kind of being affected at all, even though it is explicable in terms of the 
same principle of form receptivity operative in aisthêsis, where there is in every 
case a genuine concomitant affection.
promising the sort of discussion DA iii 4 delivers). Nonetheless, Aristotle 
holds that for both thinking and perception, it is at least necessary that the 
relevant psychic faculty be affected in a certain way by its object. Hence, 
without some form of interaction with an aisthêton, aisthêsis is impossible. 
Similarly, subject to a possible qualification,4 without some formal 
interaction with a noêton, noêsis will not occur.5
Even so, the general model of form-reception appropriate to both 
aisthêsis and noêsis requires tailoring if it is to be applied more specifically to 
the distinct psychic activities of perceiving and thinking. For nous is unlike 
the perceptive faculty in that it is not mixed with the body. If perception % 
involves the reception of a sensible form without its matter (DA 417al0-27), 
where this involves a certain organ's being informed in virtue of its being 
affected by some aisthêton, then aisthêsis is at least initially explicable in 
terms provided by Aristotle's standard model of hylomorphic change: 
something potentially informed by F-ness comes to be actually informed by F- 
ness in virtue of its suffering a certain process at the hands of some agent.6 Of 
course, how this process is to be unpacked and understood is a matter of some 
controversy; central to any discussion must be the question of whether the 
sense organ's being affected in the appropriate way is sufficient for perception, 
and if so, whether, more strongly, aisthêsis simply consists in such affection/ 
These difficult questions notwithstanding, the application of the hylomorphic 
model of change to aisthêsis has some initial appeal—or at least as much 
appeal as the hylomorphic model of change has generally.
^Some qualification may be necessary because of the perplexing rider that noêsis 
occurs only if nous is affected in a certain way by a noêton or "something else of this 
sort" (ti toiouton heteron; DA 429al4-15). The alternative dangled is somewhat 
unclear, since although he is presumably worried about the mode of affection in 
question, Aristotle may equally be concerned about the status of the noêton (or 
noêta) required for individual acts of thinking.
^This claim should not be construed in such a way that it commits Aristotle to any 
form of externalism about mental content. Thus far, Aristotle has said nothing 
more than that thoughts must have contents; an inference to externalism would 
require minimally a conception of noêta not accepted (or not obviously accepted) by 
Aristotle. For a useful discussion of externalism, see McGinn (1989). 
f>Here the terms of the analogy advanced in DA iii 4 make clear that the aisthêtikon 
is affected hupo tou aisthêtou in an instance of aisthêsis.
?See Slakey (1961), Sorabji (1971), (1974), and (1992).
Already at this basic level, however, a difference between nous and the 
aisthètikon emerges.8 9 What is potentially F in aisthêsis, what is available as 
the material substrate, are the organs themselves/ In striking contrast, nous 
is "none of the things existing in actuality before thinking" (outhen estin 
energeia(i) prin noein; DA 429a24). Aristotle's peculiar contention in this 
regard upsets the analogy he elsewhere endorses. Because nous is nothing in 
actuality before thinking, it is hard to understand how the hylomorphic 
analysis of change and affection could be brought to bear in this arena. When 
some clay receives a form, a compound comes into being. When a sense 
organ receives the form of the aisthêton, aisthêsis can occur. What receives 
the form of the noêton? Nothing in actuality is potentially the form of the 
noêton. More precisely, nothing called nous is in actuality and is such as to be 
potentially the form of the noêton before actual thinking occurs. This entails 
that before thinking there is either nothing in actuality capable of receiving 
the form of the noêton, or that although there is something in actuality 
capable of receiving the form, it is something other than nous itself. On the 
first alternative, there is evidently nothing at all in actuality which then 
suddenly exists in actuality at the moment of noêsis. On the second 
alternative, there is something in actuality which is potentially the noêton 
but (i) it is not nous before the moment of noêsis, or (ii) it never becomes, but 
only engenders, nous at the moment of noêsis. Each of these possibilities 
carries its own peculiarities. More importantly, every one of these 
possibilities suggests an approach at odds with the analysis of aisthêsis, which 
is given in terms of the hylomorphic model of change. Indeed such an 
account of "being affected in a certain way" seems hardly amenable to the 
hylomorphic model of change at all: where there is nothing antecedently to 
be affected, it is hard to see how something is reasonably held to have been 
affected in the course of noêsis. It is therefore difficult to appreciate how 
Aristotle means to deploy the hylomorphic model in his analysis of noêsis, or 
to understand why he has not simply overtaxed this model by trying to 
implement it in a domain recalcitrant to its own requirements. 89
8 Aristotle treats nous as parallel to the aisthètikon (as opposed to aisthêsis) in 
several passages. See, e.g., 402bl3,410b22 and 429M7.
9This at any rate seems to be the implication of the first lines of DA ii 12, especially 
424a24-26: "It is primarily the sense organ (aisthêtêrion) in which this capacity is 
[that is, the capacity to receive sensible forms without matter]."
This initial lack of fit recommends a closer look at Aristotle's 
motivation for distinguishing between noêsis and aisthêsis in the first place. 
His motivation emerges, though none too clearly, in the following 
compressed chain of inferences in De Anima iii 4:
Necessarily, then, since it thinks all things, nous is unmixed, just as 
Anaxagoras says, so that it may rule—but this is so that it may come to 
know. For something foreign interposing <itself> hinders and wards 
<it> off, so that its nature is nothing other than this, that it is something 
potential. Hence, the part of the soul called nous (I mean by nous that 
by which the soul thinks and conceives) is none of the things existing ifli 
actuality before it thinks. Wherefore neither is it reasonable <to say> 
that it is mixed with the body; for then it would come to be qualified in a 
certain way, either cold or hot, or would even have an organ, just as 
there is for the perceptive faculty. But as it is, there is nothing (DA 
429al8-2 7).
Central to this entire line of reasoning is Aristotle's contention that nous 
thinks all things. Generally, since nous can take on any form, it must not be 
so constituted that its own intrinsic nature would preclude its carrying out its 
operation. I will refer to this claim as the Plasticity Requirement, which we 
can set out as a first approximation as follows:
PR: Nous has no intrinsic feature capable of precluding its thinking 
any given noêton.
Thus stated, PR is not equivalent to the striking claims (i) that nous is 
nothing in actuality before thinking; (ii) that its nature consists in its being 
potential; or (iii) that it is unmixed with the body. Nor does Aristotle suppose 
that these claims are equivalent. He rather seeks to infer these doctrines 
from PR, or from an argument in which PR serves as a central premise.
Consequently, whatever its ultimate credentials, Aristotle's contention 
that nous is unmixed with the body is clearly not motivated in any direct way 
by a bland empirical observation about the brain, heart, or other central organ. 
On the contrary, the claim is that since it is nothing in actuality before 
thinking, nous cannot be mixed with the body. Presumably, then, Aristotle 
supposes that its being nothing in actuality provides sufficient grounds for 
denying that nous is mixed with the body. Its not being qualified in any way 
is not then adduced as independent evidence that it is not mixed with the
body. Rather, Aristotle adds this clause in order to shore up the inference
from:
(Pi) Before thinking, nous is none of the things which exist in actuality
to:
(C) Nous is not mixed with the body.
The structure of the argument seems to be:
(Pl) Before thinking, nous is none of the things which exist in 
actuality.
(P2) If nous were mixed with the body, it would come to have some 
quality or other, e.g. hot or cold.
(P3) Moreover, if nous were mixed with the body, it would (like the 
aisthêtikon) have an organ.
(P4) If nous is none of the things which exist in actuality before
thinking, it cannot come to have some quality or have an organ.
(Ci) Hence, nous cannot come to have some quality or have an organ.
(C2) Hence, nous is not mixed with the body.
On this construal, Aristotle uses the observations about the possibility of 
there being an organ for nous, or its being qualified in some way, as a bridge 
to the conclusion that it is not mixed with the body. He does not even claim 
independently in this context that nous lacks an organ or that it cannot be 
qualified. Rather, he offers only the hypothetical claim (P4) that if it is 
nothing in actuality before thinking, nous cannot have an organ or be 
intrinsically qualifiable. Hence, since he does not advance the consequent of 
(P4) as an independently verified premise, Aristotle cannot mean it to be 
justified by some considerations beyond those given in the passage. Hence, 
he cannot intend it to be justified on any empirical grounds, spurious or 
otherwise.
That Aristotle's approach is a priori rather than empirical should on 
reflection be unsurprising. Near the end of De Anima ii 1, Aristotle had 
raised the possibility that some part of the soul might be separate, by 
connecting the issue of separation with being an actuality (entelecheia) of a 
body:
That the soul is not separate from the body—or some of its parts if it is
naturally partite—is not unclear. For the actuality of some of them is
<the actuality> of their appropriate bodily parts> .^ Still, nothing 
prevents some of them <from being separates because of their being 
the actuality of no body (DA 413a3-7; cf. 408al2,411M8).
Here Aristotle relates the soul's being separate from the body to its being the 
actuality of a body. Something's being the actuality of the body is sufficient for 
its not being separate, since Aristotle infers the non-separability of some parts 
of the soul from their being the actuality of some bodily part. Moreover, so 
long as something is not the actuality of a body, it may be separate from the 
body. When Aristotle later seeks to infer the conclusion that nous is not 
mixed with the body from its not being anything in actuality, we merely s^g 
him re-affirming what he has said earlier by establishing the truth of a 
narrower claim by grounding it in one which is more encompassing. If nous 
is none of the things which exist in actuality before thinking, then, trivially, it 
is not the actuality of any body, at any rate not before thinking.
This interpretation frees Aristotle of an ill-motivated empirical 
grounding for a controversial philosophical thesis, but only by treating his 
remarks about the possibility of there being an organ for nous, or its being 
qualified in some way, as dependent on considerations pertaining to its 
actuality rather than as independently motivated by observation. 
Consequently, this interpretation may seem at odds with the clause which 
follows immediately upon Aristotle's introduction of the possibility of there 
being an organ for nous or its becoming qualified in some way. For he has 
seemed to some to observe directly that there is no organ for nous. As he 
says: nun d'outhen est in..= If Aristotle here simply asserts that there is no 
organ for nous, then this vitiates my contention that he never offers the 
claim that nous lacks an organ as an independent premise in the argument 
And this is surely how he has been understood.11
Yet this is not Aristotle's point. He does not here simply assert that 
nous lacks an organ. Rather, he underscores what he has said earlier, that 
nous is none of the things which exist in actuality before it thinks. The 
phrase nun d'outhen estin does not mean "but as a matter of fact it has
l^Here I suppose the inference requires eniôn to be taken closely with the meré tina 
au tés at 413a4, while merôn estin autôn looks forward to the sômatos at 413a7. 
ÏÏMany commentators have understood him this way; some views are collected by
Hicks (1907,482).
none"12 or "but as things are it has none".13 It means, instead, "as it is, it is 
nothing". When he claims that nous is none of the things existing in 
actuality before thinking and infers that it is not mixed with the body, 
Aristotle cements the inference by pointing out that if nous were the actuality 
of anything at all, it would be the actuality of an organ. He then infers that it 
is not mixed with the body, since it is not the actuality of any organ. Finally, 
he punctuates the argument by reaffirming its driving premise, that nous is 
nothing in actuality before thinking. Hence, this closing phrase does not 
undermine the interpretation I have offered. On the contrary, it provides 
additional support for the claim that nous, being nothing in actuality before 
thinking, is hardly the actuality of any body; it is therefore not mixed with the 
body.
II. Nous is Nothing in Actuality before Thinking
Aristotle argues that nous is unmixed with the body, because of its 
being nothing in actuality before thinking. His ground provided here is apt to 
bewilder us. If it is nothing in actuality before thinking, how does nous come 
to be something when thinking? Does nous come to be something when 
thinking? In either case, what would incline us to accept such a claim? 
Aristotle himself does not introduce this thesis as obvious or as justified by 
any simple appeal to our intuitions about nous. Rather he represents it as 
itself an inference from a previous set of premises, as an interim conclusion 
in a larger argument.14
This interim conclusion is evidently to be derived from PR, the claim 
that nous lacks any intrinsic feature capable of hindering its thinking any 
given noêton. Recall Aristotle's chain of inference to this point:
Necessarily, then, since it thinks all things, nous is unmixed, 
just as Anaxagoras says, so that it may rule—but this is so that it 
may come to know. For something foreign interposing 
<itself> hinders and wards <it> off, so that its nature is nothing 
other than this, that it is something potential. Hence, the part 
of the soul called nous (I mean by nous that by which the soul
^Hicks (1907,131)
l^Hamlyn (1968).
l^Note the ara at 429a22.
thinks and conceives) is none of the things existing in actuality
before it thinks (DA 429a 18-24).
Here Aristotle seeks to infer:
(C) Nous is nothing in actuality before thinking.
from:
(P) Nous thinks all things.
Unfortunately, the progress of his argument is not immediately obvious.
Perhaps Aristotle reasons as follows. Since it thinks all things, nous is 
unmixed, in an Anaxagorean sense. The relevant fragments of Anaxagoras 
do not tell us much about the sense of amigê Aristotle has in mind; and in 
any case, Aristotle himself appropriates Anaxagoras' position rather 
remorselessly by glossing hina kratê(i) as Hina gnôrizê(i) (429al9-20).15 As 
unmixed, nous has no nature other than this: that it is potential. Lacking any 
other nature, it is nothing in actuality before thinking.
If this is his point, we can represent Aristotle's argument as follows:
(PI) Nous thinks all things.
(P2) If it is to think all things, it is necessary that nous be unmixed.
(Cl) Hence, nous is unmixed.
(P3) If nous is unmixed, its nature must be nothing other than being 
potential.
(C2) Hence, its nature is nothing other than being potential.
(P4) If its nature is nothing other than being potential, nous must be 
nothing in actuality before thinking.
(C3) Hence, nous is nothing in actuality before thinking.
(C3) is, of course, simply that first premise of the argument whose conclusion 
ultimately concerns us, that nous is not mixed with the body.
l^The relevant fragment is 12 D, where nous rules the rotation of the universe and 
structures its temporal order. As I suggest in the text, the degree to which Aristotle 
accepts anything substantive from Anaxagoras is unclear. What is clear is his 
penchant for citing Anaxogoras in similar contexts, including DA 405a6. Some 
insight into his fondness for Anaxagoras's conception of nous is provided by 
Phys. 256b24, where Aristotle links being amigê to ruling in the way that nous is said 
to rule. In this passage too, however, Aristotle molds and updates the Anaxagorean 
nous for his own purposes. It is noteworthy in the Phys. Aristotle endorses the 
inference from its ruling to its being amigê, without endorsing the antecedent of the 
conditional, namely that nous rules. When he later supplants kratein with 
gnôrizein, Aristotle evidently distances himself from Anaxagoras’ conception. 
Brentano (1867/1977, 225 n. 14) rightly downplays the Anaxagoras' influence.
The move from (P4) to (C3) may seem obvious. If nous has no nature 
other than being potential, surely it is nothing in actuality before thinking.
Yet this inference is not in all ways obvious. Surely something could be 
potentially a mature member of the species—could have an unactualized 
nature—without therefore being nothing in actuality. A boy is potentially a 
mature member of his species, but is not actually so. Still, we should be hard 
pressed to deny that the boy was something actual before growing to maturity. 
At any rate, unless we meant something quite restricted by outhen estin 
energeia(i) ton ontôn, we would be unlikely to insist that an immature boy 
was nothing in actuality simply in virtue of his not being a fully actual 
human being. Moreover, if we mean something quite restricted by tHis 
phrase, then the claim that nous is nothing in actuality before thinking loses 
all (or most) of its distinctiveness. For in this case it would mean simply that 
nous is not thinking some actual thought before thinking, a claim with an air 
of dreary triviality about it.
Presumably Aristotle intends the more distinctive claim. If so, when 
he claims that it has no other nature than being potential, Aristotle supposes 
as an ancillary hypothesis that nous has no actual characteristics which do not 
pertain to its nature. For if nous has no nature other than being potential and 
has no properties adhering to it beyond those which pertain to its very nature, 
then Aristotle will be justified in moving from (P4) to (C3). He will, 
moreover, have argued for the distinctive claim that we had expected.
There is a cost associated with this reconstruction. For now (C2) carries 
more weight than it otherwise would have, and so is justifiably inferred from 
(P3) only on a robust understanding of (Cl), the initial claim that nous is 
amigê. This claim in turn is justified only if the initial premise, that nous 
thinks all things, is suitably strong. It is therefore this first premise which 
carries most of the weight of the entire argument sequence.
III. Nous Thinks All Things
When he claims that nous thinks all things, why does Aristotle not 
claim something manifestly false? On the assumption (justified, I believe, by 
429al0) that De Anima iii 4 concerns the human nows, then it is false that 
nous thinks all things. A given human nous is limited in time and power, 
and as Aristotle remarks elsewhere (EN x; Meta, xii), it is not the case that we 
are always in a position to exercise nous. I think some things at some times; 
at no time do I think all things; and even compiling all things I think 
throughout my temporally-bounded life span, I hardly think all the noêta 
there are to think. Indeed, compiling even all the thoughts of all the humans 
who ever lived or will live, then, at least on some contruals of how we might 
individuate noêta, it remains false that nous thinks all things.
If this is correct, then, Aristotle's contention must be something other 
than the clearly false claim that nous thinks everything. It must rather be the 
claim that there is no noêton which is such that it cannot be thought by nous. 
This claim would implicate Aristotle in two others, corresponding to the 
relata of a given instance of noêsis. The first concerns the structure of noêta: 
SN: Every noêton must be such that it can be thought, in principle, by 
an ideally rational human nous.
Second is a claim about the structure of human nous itself:
HN: An ideally rational human nous must be so structured that it can, 
in principle, apprehend any given noêton.
The first claim speaks to features of Aristotle's metaphysical realism,16 insofar 
as it contends that the structure of the universe is such that it can be 
apprehended. The second, co-ordinated claim speaks rather to the nature of 
nous itself. Because of its consequences for the sense in which nous is 
unmixed with body, I will focus on this second claim (HN).
It may seem that HN is also clearly false. It may seem, indeed, an 
embarrassment for Aristotle, since once again empirical limitations make it 
clear that a massively complex noêton could not be grasped by nous in the 
span of a human life. (For example, perhaps the solution to the four-color 
theorem would require so much raw computational power that no nous, no 
matter how idealized, could contemplate it in the span of a life.) This may
l^On Aristotle’s metaphysical realism, see Irwin (1988, § 2).
simply indicate, however, that Aristotle's point is conceptual rather than 
empirical in character. That is, he is not insisting that for any given noêton 
there exists some human such that that human could in fact cognize that 
noêton. Rather, he means to suggest only the weaker hypothesis that for any 
given noêton, nothing about the intrinsic character of nous itself precludes its 
being cognized. That is, he is making a point about the structure of nous and 
the limitations that structure would place on its operations. And he is 
claiming that it is possible that an ideally rational nous can think anything 
intelligible. Putative noêta of infinite complexity, if there are such, present 
no serious problem here, since empirical limitations do not undermine the 
conceptual possibility Aristotle envisages.
Still, since Aristotle baldly asserts HN, we are entitled to wonder what 
justification he has for it. The issue is pressing, since on the construal of his 
overarching argument I have offered, HN is the only premise not inferred 
from something else, and is thus the one premise whose truth cannot be 
determined at least in part on the basis of inferential warrant. Of course, 
Aristotle may simply take it as obvious; or he may have other reasons for 
asserting it which are not recapitulated in this portion of the De Anima. In 
either case, both the correctness and indeed the very character of Aristotle's 
ultimate conclusion turn on this claim.
IV. The Genesis of Aristotle's Concern: Brentano
Thus far I have suggested negatively that Aristotle's concern in De 
Anima iii 4 cannot be understood as flowing from a simple empirical error. I 
have, moreover, suggested a direction for understanding his true concern. 
Aristotle's argument is driven by what I have called PR, the plasticity 
requirement, that nous has no intrinsic properties incompatible with its 
thinking any given noêton. I am of course not alone in suspecting that 
Aristotle's real motivation lies in some concern about the operation of nous. 
Brentano famously held that Aristotle's reservations concerning nous stem 
from peculiar features of noêta, features required to understand their 
availability as objects of noêsis about which a given noêma could be.17
In Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Brentano understood 
Aristotle to be relying on a distinction between two ways a person might be
^Brentano 0874/1973).
said to take on a certain quality.18 In Brentano’s terminology, my hand is 
physically cold when it takes on a measurable temperature lower than its 
average. Even when my hand is physically cold, I may not perceive cold; 
when I do, Brentano holds that I have taken on the coldness objectively. For 
early Brentano, this follows directly from the thesis that every psychic state is 
intentional in character, that is, that every psychic state is analyzable 
relationally into act and object. Armed with this distinction, Brentano argues 
that Aristotle's point at De Anima 429a24 must be as follows. Aristotle does 
not mean that the mind's being mixed with the body in the sense of its 
becoming physically cold would somehow interfere with its becoming 
objectively cold; for clearly something can be both physically and objectively 
cold, as indeed some person could be physically cold while being objectively 
hot. Instead, if nous were mixed with the body, it would need to have some 
particular quality objectively in each of its operations. That is, if mixed with 
the body, nous would perforce have a special object in the way that each of the 
senses does. Vet there is no special object for nous. It can think all things. 
Therefore, nous is not mixed with the body.
Brentano's conjectural reconstruction merits consideration.
Something can be F in either of two ways. Let us translate from Brentano's 
preferred idiom by saying that something can either exemplify or encode F- 
ness.19 Some subject exemplifies F-ness when it instantiates F-ness in a 
direct, non-metaphorical way. So, grass exemplifies greenness. By contrast, 
something encodes F-ness when it represents F-ness without itself becoming 
F in any direct or literal way. If I dream of a man in a yellow hat, some state 
of my brain encodes the wearing of a yellow hat; no part of my brain wears a 
hat, and no part of my brain becomes yellow. Representation generally may 
encode rather than exemplify. A mental representation of Baudelaire does 
not have a floppy mustache, and so does not exemplify the property of having 
a floppy mustache. It may nevertheless encode this property in its 
representation of Baudelaire. Brentano's point is not, as one would expect, 
that if mixed with the body nous would necessarily exemplify some property,
^Brentano (1874/1973,80-89,112-148). The earlier Brentano (1867/1977,77-80, with 
229 n. 23) is not quite as crisp.
l^On exemplification and encoding, see Zalta (1984) and (1988). See also Findlay 
(1933) for a discussion Mally's (1912) distinction between erfilllen and 
determinieren, which prefigures Zalta's exemplifying and encoding.
with the result that it would be hindered in its operations. (This might be 
what one would expect him to make of 429a20-21). He argues instead that if 
nous were mixed with the body, there would be some property or other 
which nous would necessarily encode in all of its operations. This would 
hinder its operations, rendering it incapable of thinking all things.
Crucial to Brentano's understanding of the passage, therefore, is the 
claim that there is no one domain of properties every act of intellectual 
cognition necessarily encodes. By contrast, every operation of aisthêsis 
necessarily encodes some feature its peculiar object exemplifies (DA 418all-15, 
424al7-27). Every sense operation occurs by the action of a peculiar object, an 
idion, on a sense organ. Thus, every act of seeing involves the faculty of 
sight's being affected by some color, every act of hearing involves the faculty 
of hearing's being affected by some sound, and so forth. Moreover, each act of 
sensation involves a mean between excesses, a situation which prevents the 
sense from perceiving things exemplifying properties of the mean (DA 424a2- 
10). As Aristotle maintains:
For this reason we do not perceive anything which is equally as 
hot or cold <as the sense organ>, or <as> hard or soft, but rather 
excesses of these, since perception is a sort of mean between the 
opposites present in objects of perception.. .And just as that 
which is to perceive white and black must be neither of them in 
actuality, although both of them in potentiality (and so too for 
the other senses), so in the case of touch, that which is to 
perceive must be neither hot nor cold (DA 424a2-9).
Here Aristotle suggests that the senses have blind spots. If nous is similar, 
perhaps it too has blind spots. Since it thinks all things, nous must be the case 
that it does not encode any property in virtue of its operation as such. For 
then too it would be blind to objects exemplifying that property.
Brentano's explanation of Aristotle's motivation for regarding nous as 
unmixed with the body is unpersuasive.20 He seems to argue that if nous 
encodes a given property necessarily in all of its operations, then it, like sense 
perception, would fail to apprehend any object which exemplified that
20For a more sympathetic appraisal, see George (1978,252).
property.21 Here there are two problems. First, it is not the case that what 
encodes F-ness cannot also represent what exemplifies F-ness. A bust of 
Aristogeiton encodes the property having mass; it also exemplifies this 
property; and it also represents what exemplifies this property. Although a 
representation need not, and typically will not, exemplify what it represents 
as exemplifying, it may. In order to show that there is something which nous 
could not think if it necessarily encoded some property in all of its operations, 
Brentano would need to establish the strong thesis that if something encodes 
F-ness, it cannot also represent what exemplifies F-ness. Since a 
representation may do this by itself exemplifying F-ness, or indeed by 
necessarily encoding what it happens on an occasion to represent as 
exemplifying, Brentano cannot establish this stronger thesis.
Moreover, it is necessary to recall what motivates Aristotle's point 
about limitation on the range of aisthêta which are perceptible by aisthêsis . 
The examples which seem to support his contention evidently do not turn on 
whether a given sense organ necessarily encodes the property its idia 
exemplify insofar as they are idia. Rather, the examples suggest that if a given 
organ exemplifies a property it should come to encode, then there will be no 
way for it to be affected by the aisthêton in question. Consequently, the point 
seems essentially to turn on Aristotle's conviction that sensation is a paschein 
ti. Although something representing what is black can both encode and 
exemplify something black, nothing exemplifying black can be made to 
become black in the sense of being made to come to exemplify blackness. For 
what is black cannot change into what is black. Even so, something 
exemplifying, e.g., grey, can be made to come to represent something which 
exemplifies grey by being made to come to encode greyness. Thus, if a brain 
were in fact grey, it might come to encode the greyness of a grey cat by 
whatever system of representation it employs. Hence, to the degree that 
Aristotle's contentions about perceptual blind spots are justifiable, this must 
be due to the fact that the sense organs exemplify certain properties
21 Perhaps Brentano is not always consistent on this point. I am here focusing on his 
discussion in (1874/1973), and agreeing in broad outline with George's (1978) 
reconstruction of his argument. Brentano (1867/1977) does not agree in all 
particulars with the later work, and in some places seems to lapse into circularity 
(see esp. 1867/1977, 77-80). Still less in accord with this picture are some of the 
remarks about this subject in Brentano’s letters, as recounted by Spiegelberg (1978).
(including, e.g., certain temperature properties) and therefore cannot be made 
to come to exemplify those properties by an aisthêton which exemplifies 
them.
If this is correct, Brentano's contention that an embodied nous would 
necessarily encode some property in all its operations, in effect that there 
would be some idion for nous just as there is for perception, does not provide 
any warrant for Aristotle's claim that nous is unmixed with the body. For 
something could be mixed with body and still satisfy the demands for 
representational plasticity required to think all things. Since what 
exemplifies F-ness can come to encode F-ness, just as what encodes F-ness can 
exemplify F-ness, Aristotle's point does not seem to turn on the object- 
directedness of nous together with a thesis about the lack of an idion for nous. 
Therefore, Brentano's account of De Anima 429a fails to provide any warrant 
for Aristotle's striking thesis that nous is unmixed with the body.
V. Isomorphism in Intentionally
Although ultimately unconvinced by his account of Aristotle, I am in 
general sympathy with Brentano's approach. In particular, I am sympathetic 
to the suggestion that intentional features of intellectual cognition help 
explain Aristotle’s contention that nous is unmixed with the body, and 
therefore unlike the aisthêtikon in some important respects.
What are these features? Initially, Brentano formulated a three-part 
thesis of intentionality: (i) all and only mental phenomena make reference to 
or are directed upon an object; (ii) no physical phenomenon makes (intrinsic) 
reference to or is directed upon an object; and (iii) the objects upon which 
mental phenomena are directed occupy a strained ontological position insofar 
as they have "intentional inexistence”. Brentano came to reject (iii), and was 
severely criticized by Husserl for the broad scope of (i).22 Others have attacked 
his peculiarly narrow conception of an object as an individual particular.23 
Purged of these somewhat idiosyncratic features introduced by the early 
Brentano, the thesis of intentionality becomes: (i) only mental phenomena
22Husserl (1900/1970). See also Bealer (1993) and Zalta (1990).
23Bealer (1993).
make reference to or are directed upon a object;24 and (ii) no purely physical 
phenomenon is directed upon or makes reference to an object. For brevity's 
sake, I will refer to the thesis of intentionality as the thesis that only non­
physical, mental phenomena are about things.
Following Brentano, we may speak of the problem of intentionality in 
our context as Aristotle's thesis of intentionality (on the basis of, e.g., Meta. 
1074b35). Still, some caution is required here. First, when we speak of the 
problem of intentionality, we usually have in mind a nest of distinct but 
related problems beginning but not ending with the simple question of 
whether either or both parts of the thesis of intentionality turn out to be true. 
More often, philosophers have wanted to determine whether, if (i) is true, 
one can provide an analysis of the aboutness of the mental, or whether it 
must be accepted as a primitive thesis about the mental.25 Most often today, 
philosophers are concerned especially with the question of whether, if (i) is 
true, (ii) is also true, that is, whether there is a reductive or physicalistically 
adequate account of the aboutness of mental phenomena.26
Some of these concerns are clearly not Aristotle's. In particular, he 
displays no interest in the question of whether a physicalistically adequate 
account of the aboutness relation can be developed. Even so, this does not 
entail that he has no interest in offering an account of aboutness or in relying 
on the aboutness of the mental in analyzing noêsis. As I understand his 
method in the De Anima, Aristotle wants to provide an account of the 
intentional feature of noetic states in terms of their being isomorphic with 
their object.27
24i here leave unaddressed the question of whether all mental phenomena are 
intentional in character. This question turns partly on the breadth of the notion of 
object we are prepared to tolerate.
25see esp. Chisholm (1957), Bealer (1993), Parsons (1982), and Zalta (1988).
See Schiffer (1987). Some philosophers simply presume from the outset that no 
reductive analysis of intentionality, physicalistic or otherwise, is possible. Searle 
(1983, 26) provides a good example: "In my view it is not possible to give a logical 
analysis of the Intentionality of the mental. . . There is no neutral standpoint from 
which we can survey the relations between Intentional states and the world and 
then describe them in non-Intentionalistic terms. Any explanation of 
Intentionality, therefore, takes place within the circle of Intentional terms."
27See n. 2 above.
One passage in particular is relevant here. In De Anima iii 4, Aristotle 
maintains:
Now, if thinking is akin to perceiving, it would be either being 
affected in some way by the object of thought or something else of 
this sort. It must then be unaffected, but capable of receiving the 
form, and potentially such as it, but not identical with it (DA 
429al3-16).
Here Aristotle simply draws out one of the features of the analogy with 
aisthêsis he accepts. Just as perception consists in the reception of perceptible 
forms (DA 424al7-27), so thinking consists in the reception of intelligible 
forms.
In committing himself to this feature of the analogy between aisthêsis 
and noêsis, Aristotle adopts a thesis of isomorphism:
(I) The mind is one in form with its objects.
In accepting (I), Aristotle does not yet accept any more substantive thesis that 
a given state of mind is about an object by being isomorphic with it. Nor does 
he issue any general claim to the effect that aboutness as such is to be analyzed 
in terms of isomorphism. Nonetheless, we have the general claim that when 
S thinks o, where o can be a particular individual in Brentano's sense or a 
more structured composite semantic unit, S's doing so is to be explained by a 
formal state of S which S shares with o.
Now, when asserting that nous must be receptive of a form (dektikon 
tou eidous), Aristotle's contention is crucially ambiguous, between a stronger 
and a weaker hypothesis. He argues that nous and its objects are one in form. 
Or rather, he claims that "the actuality of that which is sensed (tou aisthêtou) 
and sensation is one and the same" (DA 425b26). Given the terms of the 
analogy between aisthêsis and noêsis, this requires that the actuality of the 
noêton and the mind are one and the same. This in turn suggest a 
surprisingly strong conception of isomorphism: the form of what thinks is 
numerically the same as the form of what is thought in actuality when noêsis 
occurs. Aristotle seems to embrace this picture when claiming that "the soul 
is, in a sense, all things which exist, for these are either perceived or thought" 
(DA 431b21-2).
On this strong thesis of isomorphism, what thinks and what is thought 
are isomorphic in a limiting sense of being numerically one and the same. 
Most noteworthy about strong isomorphism is that it suggests an arresting
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approach to aboutness: in noêsis, a state of S is about an object o because the 
form of that state is the form of that object. This is noteworthy because it 
treats isomorphism as non-representational. The state of S directed upon o 
does not merely represent o, but rather becomes the form of o itself.
Precisely in virtue of its arresting non-representationalism, strong 
isomorphism has proven attractive to many.28 Lear, for example, suggests: 
The perceptible object and the corresponding sense faculty stand to 
each other as two potentialities which have a single actualization. 
The perceptible object has the capacity to be perceived, the sense- 
faculty has the capacity to perceive. The single actualization is the 
act of perceiving—and this occurs in the perceiver.. .This higher- 
level actuality of sensible form can occur only in a sense faculty.
Thus the highest level of actuality of perceptible form occurs not 
in the perceptible object, but in the sense faculty of a being who is 
perceiving the form.29 
The same holds true, mutatis mutandis, of noêsis. A given object of thought 
is most fully actual when cognized. The form of a frog, as Lear claims, is not 
fully actual when that frog is engaging in archetypal froggy behavior, but 
when it is actualized in a mind contemplating that frog. Isomorphism is 
numerical identity. States of mind are about objects because they are those 
objects in their highest states.
This suggests an odd, non-representational account of isomorphism, 
one centrally at variance with the account Brentano offers. Perhaps one 
advantage of strong isomorphism is its ability to undercut a persistent 
tendency to rely on a primitive notion of similarity in explaining 
isomorphism.30 This is problematic for a host of familiar reasons, including:
28See Anscombe and Geach (1961) and Kosman (1975).
29Lear (1988,103).
30Cummins (1989, 4) understands Aristotle this way: "The basic idea behind 
[Aristotle’s! theory is that to know something is, in a pretty straightforward sense, to 
be i t . . .  Your mind literally is just what the physical stuff is, because to be red and 
spherical is just to be inFORMed by redness and sphericity.. .To represent the world 
is to have a model of it in (on?) your mind—a model made of different stuff, as 
models usually are, but a model just the same.. .According to this theory, 
representation is evidently founded on similarity (shared properties)—a similarity, 
the theorist can just see'* Cummins rightly rejects Aristotle's theory so construed. I 
doubt the theory advertised is in fact Aristotle's.
(i) data structures need not resemble what they represent (the equations of 
analytical geometry do not look like figures); and (ii) similarity short of exact 
duplication is always to some degree perceiver relative, with the result that 
similarity collapses into perceived similarity, and thus into the kind of 
intentional relation it was meant to explain in the first place.31
However that might be, Aristotle himself does not endorse strong 
isomorphism. In any number of passages, he limits the degree to which he is 
willing to identify the forms of an informed nous and its correlative noêton. 
Our first indication is the caution Aristotle exercises occurs in the very 
statement of his theory: "The soul is, in a sense, all things which exist, for 
these are either perceived or thought" (DA 431b21-2). The soul is in a sense 
(pôs) all things, where the pôs fairly clearly indicates strong reservations 
about the form of sameness envisaged (cf. DA 417b22-24, Meta. 1045b21). 
Further, Aristotle makes plain that although the mind is capable of receiving 
the form, it is potentially such as the form, although not identical with it (DA 
429al5-16). He demonstrates similar circumspection about aisthèsis: "These 
[the objects of perception] and perception are, then, the same, though they 
differ with respect to being (to einai)" (DA 424a25-6). When using such 
expressions as "the Fs and Gs are the same, although to einai Fdatis not the 
same as to einai Gdat/' Aristotle usually means that even where ’F  and 'G' 
are extensionally equivalent, accounts of F and G differ, with the result that 
being-F and being-G are not the same property. Here too Aristotle points out 
that even if some aisthêton or noêton is actualized qua aisthêton or noêton 
only in a certain kind of mental act, what performs the act and its object are 
nevertheless numerically distinct.
This is fortunate, since otherwise Aristotle's theory would have 
intolerable results. If strong isomorphism were true, then on the assumption 
that two people can think the same object, your intellect could be numerically 
identical with mine in contemplation. Given the transitivity of identity, if Si 
thinks o, and is therefore numerically identical with o, and Sü thinks o, then 
Sj and Sü will themselves be numerically identical. This is clearly not the 
case.
Nonetheless, strong isomorphism was supposed to have the advantage 
of non-representationalism. Representationalist interpretations of
See Cummins (1989, Ch. 3).
isomorphism (weak isomorphism) ran into difficulties of their own. Hence, 
there seems to be a certain dilemma for Aristotle. Either he accepts strong or 
weak isomorphism. If he accepts strong isomorphism, then he commits 
himself to the absurdity that distinct minds are numerically identical. If he 
accepts weak isomorphism, then he avoids that result only by embracing a 
similarity theory, which is manifestly false. Hence, isomorphism is either 
absurd or manifestly false.
We have seen that Aristotle rejects strong isomorphism. Does this 
entail that his approach to intentionality is a non-starter? He would be 
constrained to accept the second horn of this dilemma only if it could be 
shown that weak isomorphism required similarity for representation. But 
surely it does not. If we agree antecedently that representation can occur 
without similarity, and further agree, as against strong isomorphism, that 
nous is the form of its object as a discrete entity representing it, then it is open 
to us to deny the purportedly unacceptable consequences of weak 
isomorphism. And if we can accept weak isomorphism, we can look to a 
development of isomorphism as a grounding for Aristotelian intentionality.
VI. Weak Isomorphism and th Distinctness of Nous
Reflecting on Aristotle's weak isomorphism, we may be able to come to 
a deeper appreciation of his conception of the relation of nous to the body.
The argument, strictly, is an argument for the conclusion that nous is not 
mixed with the body (DA 4229a24-25); it is not an argument for the claim that 
nous is immaterial in any sense approximating substance dualism. The one 
clear motivation for this conclusion is PR, the plasticity requirement, that 
nous has no intrinsic feature capable of precluding its thinking any given 
noêton. This thesis, in a suitably qualified form, may be defensible. 
Consequently, Aristotle's conclusion may be both more modest and more 
plausible than was initially supposed.
It may be more modest in the sense that it amounts to nothing more 
than the contention that intentional phenomena are not amenable to 
physicalistic analyses. That is, Aristotle accepts both parts of the thesis of 
intentionality. In this sense, his claim about mixture may not be the radical 
doctrine it seemed to be. He merely holds that noetic phenomena are about 
things (that they have objects) and that no account of this aboutness can be 
given in bodily terms. Consequently, nous will be choriston logô(i): no
account of its activities need be couched in terms of the operations of a body. 
Indeed, no complete account can be given in purely physicalistic terms, since 
no physicalistic analysis of aboutness can be advanced.
Although deflationary to a point, Aristotle's claim is not merely that 
no such account has been provided. It is rather the stronger claim that no 
such account can be given. Now, because he is, on this interpretation, 
arguing for a comparatively modest thesis, Aristotle need not offer any 
aggressively anti-physicalistic argument. Still, even the modest conclusion is 
strong enough.
The resources of weak isomorphism provide the following approach. 
Nous satisfies PR, the plasticity requirement, at least in the sense that there is 
an infinite number of things nous can think. Each instance of noêsis 
involves a paschein ti, a suffering something, or a being affected in a certain 
way—or at any rate a being affected after a fashion. This being affected may be 
either a change from potentiality to a first actuality, in learning, or a change 
from first to second actuality, when a thinker moves from dispositionally to 
occurrently knowing p. In either case, a certain change is effected. When a 
thinker suffers something in the sense of changing from potentially knowing 
p to actually knowing p (so, to acquiring p as a first actuality), weak 
isomorphism entails that that thinker acquires a new structure. If that 
thinker's nous is already structured, it will be precluded from coming to 
acquire the structure of the noêton whose structure it already has. Moreover, 
if it is actually structured in a permanent way, then nous will be 
compositionally rigid rather than compositionally plastic.
Now, Aristotle presumes that if nous is mixed with the body it will 
necessarily be structured in a certain way. More precisely, he thinks that if 
nous is the actuality of a body, it will be in actuality, and hence will be so 
structured that for some noêton, it will already be weakly isomorphic with 
that noêton. Since that noêton could not, consequently, cause it to be affected 
in such a way that it will acquire its structure, nous will be cognitively blind 
relative to that noêton. If it is blind to some noêton, nous cannot think all 
things; there will be some noêton to which nous will in principle be 
precluded from standing in intentional relations. Is so, nous will not satisfy 
PR, and so will not think all things.
In sum, Aristotle seems to have two non-equivalent motivations. On 
the analogy with aisthêsis, we expect nous to have an epistemic blind spot if it
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is the actuality of a body. If it is the form of a certain body, then it will be 
actually structured in a definite way. If it is structured in a definite way, then 
nous cannot be made to acquire the structure it already has, and so cannot be 
affected, even in an attenuated way. That is, nous cannot be made to come to 
exemplify its own structure.
Here there are two worries. First, if this is Aristotle's point, the 
argument ultimately rests on a remarkably thin observation. Aristotle means 
to point out that if nous is structured, there will be one form it cannot 
acquire. It will therefore not become that form. Yet if it has that form, it is 
not clear why it will need to become it in order to think the noëton whose 
form it is.32 Even waiving that, and granting that there is one thought to 
which nous would be epistemically blind in virtue of its constitution, it may 
be thought odd to suppose that PR is so secure that we can rely on it to infer 
that nous cannot be so constituted. For, it is hard to see what principle 
Aristotle could offer in support of PR which would not implicitly appeal to 
the immateriality of nous itself, and hence land him in an unsatisfactory 
circularity.
Presumably Aristotle might want to respond that if nous is the actual 
structure of a body, its own intrinsic structure not only renders it blind to the 
noêton with which it is isomorphic, but also precludes its receiving other 
structures. Here PR may seem to go well beyond the analogy with perception 
by adding another premise. The premise is this: if F is actually structured, 
then it cannot take on another structure. Yet this is clearly false as regards 
first actualities., where this seems to be the appropriate level of noetic 
acquisition (DA 417bl-16). If on the other hand, we understand Aristotle to 
mean that what is actually contemplating cannot contemplate all things, then 
his locution is most odd: we should expect him to say directly that what is 
actually contemplating cannot contemplate more than one thing. We should 
then be surprised to read that nous can think all things. For surely the point 
would then be not that nous can think all things, but that it cannot think of 
more than one thing at an instant. Hence, it may seem difficult to discern 
any promising systematic argument for the incorporeality of nous, even in 
the less ambitious sense mentioned.
32still, this at least helps explain the otherwise perplexing and ill-motivated aporta 
about nous coming to think itself at DA 429b26.
Still, there is perhaps one way of developing PR such that it really does 
provide á good reason for endorsing the second half of the thesis of 
intentionality, that no purely physical phenomenon is directed upon or 
makes reference to an object. (This would be the thesis of irreducibility.) PR 
holds that nous can think all things. This does not state or entail that nous 
can adopt an infinite, or even uncountably finite, number of attitudes toward 
noëta. Aristotle frequently enough recognizes various attitudes nous is 
capable of adopting (in DA iii 4 these include ginoskein, phronein, 
dianoeisthai, and hupolambanein). If there is no non-intentional way of 
analyzing intentionality as such (that is, if the first part of the thesis of 
intentionality is true), then the only way to provide a physicalistically 
reductive account of intentionality would be to provide individual analyses 
of each of these states seriatim, and then to try to string them together in 
some form of "disjunctive" analysis.
Even if we permit disjunctive analyses count as proper analyses, as I 
doubt we should, the plasticity of the mental renders it highly unlikely that 
anyone could determine that they had listed and analyzed the last possible 
type of intentional attitude. Any claim to have found the last intentional 
attitude would ring hollow ring in the extreme, because such a contention 
would pretend to have provided a complete, exhaustive taxonomy of all the 
logically possible types of intentional attitude.
If he wants to argue this way, Aristotle presumes a strong but justifiable 
principle of plasticity. Wedding this to a principle of weak isomorphism as a 
component in a non-reductive approach to the intentionality, Aristotle may 
conclude first that it is not necessary to mention the body in an account of 
noêsis, and then more strongly that any account mentioning a body will miss 
the mark of the mental. We may think that Aristotle overemphasizes PR in 
offering this argument. Perhaps, but each time we offer a physicalistic 
analysis of intentionality, something foreign interposes itself, and somehow 
hinders and wards off our effort.
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